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1 Introduction
A wide-spread perception among economists is that macroeconomic busi-
ness-cycle fluctuations are not driven only by shocks on technologies or
preferences, but also by changes in expectations about the fundamentals. A
major strand of the literature focussing on fluctuations derived from agents’
beliefs is based on the concept of sunspot equilibria that dates back to the
early works of Shell [14], Azariadis [1] and Cass and Shell [3]. As shown
by Woodford [16], the existence of sunspot equilibria is closely related to
the equilibrium indeterminacy under perfect foresight, i.e. the existence of
a continuum of equilibrium paths converging toward one steady state from
the same initial value of the state variable.
Since the contribution of Reichlin [12], the possible co-existence of dy-
namic efficiency, i.e., Pareto-optimal equilibrium paths, and local indeter-
minacy in OLG models has been widely discussed in the literature. This
is an important question in terms of stabilization policies. Indeed, when
local indeterminacy occurs under dynamic efficiency, the introduction of a
public policy based on taxes and transfers could at the same time stabi-
lize the economy and reach the Pareto optimal steady state along which all
generations get an equal level of welfare. On the contrary, when local inde-
terminacy occurs under dynamic inefficiency, stabilization policies targeting
the steady state leave room for welfare losses. Although Reichlin [12] has
shown that locally indeterminate dynamically efficient equilibria can occur
in an aggregate model with a Leontief technology, Cazzavillan and Pintus
[4] have recently proved that this result is not robust to the introduction of
any positive capital-labor substitution.
In Galor [8] type two-sector OLG models, with one pure consumption
good and one pure investment good, the conclusion is not so clear-cut. In-
deed, Drugeon et al. [7] and Nourry and Venditti [11] have proved that local
indeterminacy is ruled out when the steady state is dynamically efficient pro-
vided the sectoral technologies are not too close to Leontief functions. The
intuition of this result is quite simple. Starting from an arbitrary equi-
librium, consider another one in which the agents expect a higher rate of
investment at time t leading to some higher capital stock at time t+1. This
expectation will be self-fulfilling provided the amount of saving at date t is
large enough to support the increase of the investment good output which
directly provides the capital stock of the next period. When the equilibrium
is dynamically efficient, the share of first period consumption is large enough
to generate a stationary capital stock lower than the Golden Rule and thus
prevents the agent from saving enough. At the same time, when the sectoral
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technologies have elasticities of capital-labor substitution far enough from
zero, any transfer of capital in the investment good sector is followed by a
decrease of labor so that the final output cannot generate a large enough
increase of capital.1 As a result, the initial expectation cannot be realized as
an equilibrium, and, under dynamic efficiency, local indeterminacy together
with fluctuations based on local sunspots are ruled out.
However, in a multisector framework, the assumption of a unique con-
sumption good is highly peculiar and is likely to generate singular prop-
erties. When heterogeneous sectors are introduced, it is quite common to
consider instead that multiple consumption goods co-exist.2 In such a case,
the existence of additional substitution mechanisms between the different
consumption goods suggests that new conclusions could be obtained. Un-
fortunately, the literature on OLG models has almost exclusively focused
on Galor-type formulations. Among the few contributions dealing with a
different framework, the most noteworthy contribution is the paper of Kalra
[10] which studies the existence of cyclical equilibria in a generalization of
the standard two-sector model by assuming that both goods are consumed.3
Beside the pure consumption good, the second sector produces a mixed
good which can be either consumed or used as capital. Such a formulation,
which is much in line with standard national accounting data than the usual
Galor-type formulation,4 allows for the existence of intratemporal substitu-
tion in consumption. Kalra then shows that local indeterminacy through
the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation is more likely to occur than in the
standard Galor-type model.5 However, as he does not discuss the dynamic
efficiency property of the equilibrium, nothing is said about the question
initially raised by Reichlin [12].
The purpose of this paper is then to complement the analysis of Kalra
1On the contrary, when the technologies are close to Leontief, capital and labor are
complement and both can be transfered in the investment good sector so that the in-
crease of the final output may compensate the lack of savings and lead to an increase of
capital compatible with the expectations. As shown in Nourry and Venditti [11], local
indeterminacy then becomes compatible with dynamic efficiency.
2See for instance Benhabib and Nishimura [2] for an optimal growth infinite-horizon
model with many consumption goods.
3See also Drugeon [6] for the analysis of saddle-point stability in a similar model with
endogenous labor.
4National accounting data are based on subdivisions of the productive sectors in which
many goods are both final and intermediary.
5For instance Reichlin [13] proves the existence of a Hopf bifurcation in a standard
OLG model with Leontief technologies and Kalra [10] extends this conclusion to the case
of technologies with substitutable factors.
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and to explore the existence of dynamically efficient endogenous fluctuations.
A simple intuition suggests indeed that new conclusions can be obtained.
With two consumption goods, everything else equal, the stock of capital in
the next period supported by the amount of saving at date t is lower than in
the standard case since it is based on a mixed good output decreased by the
part which is used for consumption. In such a case, a given amount of saving
may be compatible with the expectation of a higher capital stock at time
t+ 1 if a larger part of the mixed good output is consumed. Based on this
new channel, local indeterminacy and the existence of expectations-driven
fluctuations can become compatible with dynamic efficiency under standard
sectoral technologies with larger elasticities of capital-labor substitution.
We consider a simplified version of the Kalra’s model assuming a unitary
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between the two consumption goods.
We provide a simple condition for dynamic efficiency. Then we show that,
according to the previous intuition, when the pure consumption good is capi-
tal intensive, local indeterminacy and expectations-driven fluctuations occur
for dynamically efficient competitive equilibria with larger sectoral elastici-
ties of capital-labor substitution than in the standard model, provided the
share of the pure consumption good in utility is low enough. We thus show
that Reichlin’s [12] result is more robust in a two-sector OLG economy with
multiple consumption goods than in the standard Galor-type formulation.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 proves the existence of a steady state and provides a condition for
dynamic efficiency. Section 4 contains our main results on the co-existence
of local indeterminacy and dynamic efficiency. Some results under dynamic
inefficiency are also provided in order to establish a better understanding of
the relationship between the Pareto optimality and the dynamic properties
of competitive equilibria. Concluding comments are in Section 5 and the
proofs are gathered in a final Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The production side
We consider an economy with two produced goods, one pure consumption
good y0 which cannot be used as capital, and one mixed good y which can
be either consumed or invested, i.e. used as capital. There are two inputs,
capital and labor. We assume complete depreciation of capital within one
period and that labor is inelastically supplied. We then get
yt − zt = kt+1 (1)
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with zt the consumption part of the mixed good in period t, and kt+1 the
total amount of capital in period t+ 1.
Each good is produced with a constant returns to scale technology such
that y0 = f
0(k0, l0) and y = f1(k1, l1), with k0 + k1 ≤ k, k being the total
stock of capital, and l0 + l1 ≤ `, ` being the total amount of labor.
Assumption 1. Each production function f i : R2+ → R+, i = 0, 1, is C2,
increasing in each argument, concave, homogeneous of degree one and such
that for any x > 0, f i1(0, x) = f
i
2(x, 0) = +∞, f i1(+∞, x) = f i2(x,+∞) = 0.
For any given (k, y, `), profit maximization in the representative firm of
each sector is equivalent to solving the following problem of optimal alloca-
tion of productive factors between the two sectors:
τ(k, y, `) = max
k0,k1,l0,l1≥0
f0(k0, l0)
s.t. y ≤ f1(k1, l1), k0 + k1 ≤ k and l0 + l1 ≤ `
(2)
The social production function τ(k, y, `) gives the maximal output of the
consumption good. Under Assumption 1, τ(k, y, `) is homogeneous of degree
one, concave and twice continuously differentiable.6 Denoting w the wage
rate, r the gross rental rate of capital and p the price of the mixed good, all
in terms of the price of the pure consumption good, we derive
r = τ1(k, y, `), p = −τ2(k, y, `), w = τ3(k, y, `) (3)
2.2 The consumption side
In each period t, Nt agents are born, and they live for two periods. In
their first period of life (when young), the agents are endowed with one
unit of labor that they supply inelastically to firms. Their income is equal
to the real wage. They allocate this income between current consumption
and savings which are invested in the firms. In their second period of life
(when old), they are retired and their income resulting from the return on
the savings is entirely consumed. Each agent is assumed to have one child
so that population is constant, i.e., Nt = N .
The preferences of a representative agent born at time t are defined
over his consumption bundle for each of the two produced goods, c0t , c
1
t ,
when young, and d0t+1, d
1
t+1, when old. They are summarized by the utility
function U(c0t , c
1
t , d
0
t+1, d
1
t+1) = u(Ct, Dt+1/B) with
Ct = (c
0
t )
θ(c1t )
1−θ, Dt+1 = (d0t+1)
θ(d1t+1)
1−θ (4)
6See Benhabib and Nishimura [2].
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and7
u(Ct, Dt+1/B) =
[
C
1−1/γ
t + δ(Dt+1/B)
1−1/γ
]γ/(γ−1)
(5)
where 0 < θ ≤ 1, δ > 0 is the discount factor, γ > 0 is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption and B > 0 is a scaling parameter.
Ct and Dt+1 can be interpreted as composite goods derived from the two
consumption goods y0t and zt with
y0t = T (kt, yt, `t) = N
(
c0t + d
0
t
)
and zt = N
(
c1t + d
1
t
)
(6)
It follows that θ is the share of the pure consumption good and 1 − θ the
share of the mixed good in the composite goods C and D.
A young agent born in period t has first to solve two static problems
of optimal composition of his two composite goods. Denoting by pit the
consumer price index in terms of the pure consumption good, we get the
following optimization program for Ct
max
c0t ,c
1
t≥0
(
c0t
)θ (
c1t
)1−θ
s.t. c0t + ptc
1
t = pitCt (7)
The corresponding program for Dt+1 is similar with d
0
t+1 + pt+1d
1
t+1 =
pit+1Dt+1. Solving the associated first order conditions gives:
c0t = θpitCt, c
1
t =
(1−θ)pitCt
pt
, pit =
(
pt
1−θ
)1−θ
θ−θ (8)
with similar expressions for d0t+1 and d
1
t+1, namely
d0t+1 = θpit+1Dt+1, d
1
t+1 =
(1−θ)pit+1Dt+1
pt+1
(9)
Under perfect foresight, and considering wt and Rt+1 as given, a young
agent also has to solve an intertemporal allocation problem in order to max-
imize his utility function over his life-cycle:
max
Ct,Dt+1,φt≥0
u(Ct, Dt+1/B) s.t. wt = pitCt + φt and Rt+1φt = pit+1Dt+1
Solving the first order conditions gives:
Ct =
wt/pit
1+δγ [Rt+1pit/(Bpit+1)]
γ−1 ≡ α(vt)wt/pit (10)
with vt = Rt+1pit/(Bpit+1) and α(vt) ∈ (0, 1) the propensity to consume of
the young, or equivalently the share of first period consumption spending
over the wage income. We also get the saving function
φt = φ (wt, vt) ≡ (1− α (vt))wt (11)
In the rest of the paper we introduce the following standard Assumption:
Assumption 2. γ > 1
Such a restriction implies that the saving function (11) is increasing with
respect to the gross rate of return R.
7All the results in this paper can be obtained with a general concave and homothetic
utility function u(Ct, Dt+1/B).
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3 Dynamic efficiency of competitive equilibrium
3.1 Perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium
Total labor is given by the number of young households and is normal-
ized to one, i.e., ` = N = 1. From now on, let τ(k, y, 1) = T (k, y) and
τi(k, y, 1) = Ti(k, y), i = 1, 2, 3. Using (1), (3) and (11), a perfect-foresight
competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence {kt, yt}t≥0 that satisfies
(1− α (Rt+1pit/(Bpit+1)))wt = kt+1 and yt− zt = kt+1 with Rt+1 = rt+1/pt.
Using (6), (8) and (9), we conclude that a perfect-foresight competitive
equilibrium satisfies the following system of two difference equations:
kt+1 +
T3(kt,yt)
[
1−α
(
−T1(kt+1,yt+1)
T2(kt,yt)B
(
T2(kt,yt)
T2(kt+1,yt+1)
)1−θ)]
T2(kt,yt)
= 0
kt+1 − ytθ − (1−θ)[T3(kt,yt)+T1(kt,yt)kt]θT2(kt,yt) = 0
(12)
with k0 given.
It is worth noting at this point that if θ = 1 the second difference equa-
tions reduces to kt+1 = yt and we get the standard two-sector OLG model
with one pure consumption good and one pure investment good studied in
Drugeon et al. [7] and Nourry and Venditti [11].8
3.2 A normalized steady state
A steady state (kt, yt) = (k
∗, y∗) for all t satisfies
k∗ +
T3(k∗,y∗)
[
1−α
(
− T1(k∗,y∗)
T2(k
∗,y∗)B
)]
T2(k∗,y∗) = 0
k∗ − y∗θ − (1−θ)[T3(k
∗,y∗)+T1(k∗,y∗)k∗]
θT2(k∗,y∗) = 0
(13)
We consider a family of economies parameterized by the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution in consumption γ. We follow the same procedure
as in Drugeon et al. [7]: we use the scaling parameter B and the share θ
to ensure the existence of a normalized steady state (NSS) (k∗, y∗) which
remains invariant as γ is varied.
Let us define the maximum admissible value of capital k¯ solution of:
k¯ − f1(k¯, 1) = 0
Under Assumption 1 we have indeed f1(k, 1) > k if k < k¯, while f1(k, 1) < k
if k > k¯. Obviously, the NSS must be such that (k∗, y∗) ∈ (0, k¯)× (0, k¯). We
then get:
8See also Galor [8] and Venditti [15].
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Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, let (k∗, y∗) ∈ (0, k¯)× (0, k¯). Then
there exist unique values θ(k∗, y∗) ∈ (0, 1) and B(k∗, y∗, γ) > 0 such that
(k∗, y∗) is a steady state if and only if θ = θ(k∗, y∗) and B = B(k∗, y∗, γ).
Proof : See Appendix 6.1.
In the rest of the paper we assume θ = θ(k∗, y∗) and B = B(k∗, y∗, γ) so
that the share of capital in total income, as given by
s = s(k∗, y∗) = r
∗k∗
T (k∗,y∗)+p∗y∗ (14)
and α = α(R∗/B(k∗, y∗, γ)) remain constant as γ is made to vary.
3.3 Dynamic efficiency
From the homogeneity of τ , considering that k∗T2/T3 = (T2/T1)(k∗T1/T3) =
−s/(R(1− s)), we derive the stationary gross rate of return along the NSS:
R∗ = s(1−α)(1−s) (15)
It is well-known that in OLG models if the capital-labor ratio exceeds the
Golden-Rule level, the economy is dynamically inefficient. In our two-sector
model, the Golden-Rule level, denoted kˆ, is characterized from the total
stationary consumption which is given by the sum of the social production
function with the consumption part of the mixed good, namely C + D =
T (k, y)+p[y−k]. Denoting R(k, y) = −T1(k, y)/T2(k, y), kˆ satisfies as usual
R(kˆ, yˆ) ≡ Rˆ = 1. Under-accumulation of capital is obtained if and only if
R∗ > 1. As in Drugeon et al. [7] we get:
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, let α = 1 − s/(1 − s). Then an in-
tertemporal competitive equilibrium converging towards the NSS is dynami-
cally efficient if α ∈ (α, 1) and dynamically inefficient if α ∈ (0, α).
Dynamic inefficiency can be avoided if the amount of savings is not too large.
4 Endogenous business cycles
Our aim is to show that a two-sector OLG model with two consumption
goods provides new results on the existence of endogenous business cycles
derived from agents’ beliefs. This type of fluctuations is based on the concept
of sunspot equilibria. As shown by Woodford [16], the existence of sunspot
equilibria is closely related to the equilibrium local indeterminacy, i.e. the
existence of a continuum of equilibrium paths converging toward the NSS
from the same initial capital stock. In our framework, local indeterminacy
7
occurs when the characteristic roots associated with the linearization of
equations (12) around the NSS are less than 1 in absolute value.
We focus on two particular aspects of the model: the share θ of the pure
consumption good in the composite goods C and D, and the share α of first
period consumption spending in total income. Let us also introduce the
relative capital intensity difference across sectors and the elasticity of the
rental rate of capital, respectively
b ≡ l1y
(
k1
l1
− k0
l0
)
and εrk = −T11(k∗, y∗)k∗/T1(k∗, y∗) (16)
Note that εrk is negatively linked to the sectoral elasticities of capital-labor
substitution (see Drugeon [5]).
4.1 A labor intensive pure consumption good
Let us consider first the case b > 0. We derive from the homogeneity of τ
and equations (3) that at the NSS b < bMax with
bMax =
s
R∗[1−θ[(1−s)α+s]] > 0 (17)
We get the following results:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-2, any equilibrium path is unique and
monotone when the pure consumption good is labor intensive (b ∈ (0, bMax)).
Proof : See Appendix 6.2.
This Proposition implies that endogenous fluctuations and local indeter-
minacy are ruled out when b ∈ (0, bMax). It complements the analysis of
Kalra [10] in the case of a labor intensive pure consumption good. First it
confirms that endogenous period-2 cycles through the existence of negative
characteristic roots and a flip bifurcation are ruled out. Second, it proves
that endogenous quasi-periodic cycles through the existence of a Hopf bifur-
cation are also ruled out in the case of a unitary elasticity of intratemporal
substitution between the two consumption goods. Therefore, Proposition 2
in Kalra [10] requires an elasticity sufficiently lower than one.
4.2 A capital intensive pure consumption good
Let us consider from now on the case b < 0 and focus in a first step on
dynamically efficient equilibria with α > α. We assume θ < 1/2 to provide
conditions for the existence of local indeterminacy through the occurrence of
a Hopf bifurcation. The motivation to consider such a configuration comes
from the fact that when θ is close to 1, a Hopf bifurcation cannot occur
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under dynamic efficiency (see Nourry and Venditti [11]). We also restrict
the share of capital to get a positive value for the bound α = 1− s/(1− s)
and to be compatible with standard empirical values:
Assumption 3. s ∈ [1/3, 1/2)
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, let α > s/(1 − s)(> α) and b ∈
(−(1− α)s/ [α(1− θ + θs)] , 0). Then there exist θ¯ ∈ (s/[(1− s)α+ s], 1/2],
˜rk < rk < ¯rk and γH , γF > γT > 1 such that when θ ∈ (s/[(1−s)α+s], θ¯),
the following results hold:
1 - If rk ∈ (rk, ¯rk), then γF > γH and the NSS is locally indeterminate
when γ ∈ (γT , γH) and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation when γ = γH . More-
over, there generically exist locally indeterminate (resp. locally unstable)
quasi-periodic cycles when γ ∈ (γH , γH + ) (resp. γ ∈ (γH − , γH)) with
 > 0, i.e. when the bifurcation is super (resp. sub-) critical.
2 - If rk ∈ (˜rk, rk), then γH > γF and the NSS is locally indeterminate
when γ ∈ (γ′T , γF ) and undergoes a flip bifurcation when γ = γF . More-
over there generically exist locally indeterminate (resp. saddle-point stable)
period-two cycles when γ ∈ (γF , γF + ε) (resp. γ ∈ (γF − ε, γF )) with ε > 0,
i.e. when the bifurcation is super (resp. sub-) critical.
Proof : See Appendix 6.3.
Remark 1. Whether the bifurcation is super or sub-critical is driven by the
sign of some coefficient computed from the second and third order approx-
imations of the dynamical system (12). This property determines whether
the bifurcation leads to the occurrence of locally indeterminate or unstable
(resp. saddle-point stable) quasi-periodic (resp. period-two) cycles near the
bifurcation value.
Proposition 4 shows that when the share θ of the pure consumption good in
the composite goods is low enough, local indeterminacy and expectations-
driven fluctuations arise when rk ∈ (˜rk, ¯rk), i.e. for strictly positive but
intermediary values of the sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution.
We then get more general conclusions for a wider range of elasticities of
capital-labor substitution than in the case θ = 1 in which the occurrence of
local indeterminacy is only obtained through a flip bifurcation and requires
to consider sectoral technologies very close to Leontief functions (see Nourry
and Venditti [11]). The intuition for the existence of dynamically efficient
expectations-driven fluctuations with multiple consumption goods given in
the introduction is thus confirmed.
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We thus show that Reichlin’s [12] result is more robust in a two-sector
OLG economy with multiple consumption goods than in the Galor-type
formulation. The introduction of a public policy based on taxes and transfers
can at the same time stabilize the economy and reach the Pareto optimal
steady state along which all generations get an equal level of welfare.9
In order to establish a better understanding of the relationship between
the Pareto optimality and the dynamic properties of competitive equilibria,
let us finally focus on dynamically inefficient equilibria with α < α. We
successively consider the existence of local indeterminacy through flip and
Hopf bifurcations. As mentioned in Remark 1, the two following Proposi-
tions will encompass the super and sub-critical bifurcations. Let us denote
b¯ = min
{
1
R∗(1−θ)−θ ,− (1−α)sα[1−θ+θs]
}
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1-3, let α < α. If one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
i) θ ∈ (s/[1− α(1− s)], 1/2) and b < b¯,
ii) θ ∈ (1/2, [s2 +α(1− s)]/[2s2 +α(1− s)2]) and b ∈ (1/[R∗(1− 2θ)], b¯),
then there exists γF > 1 such that the NSS is locally indeterminate when
γ > γF and undergoes a flip bifurcation when γ = γF . Moreover, there
generically exist locally indeterminate (resp. saddle-point stable) period-two
cycles when γ ∈ (γF − ε, γF ) (resp. γ ∈ (γF , γF + ε)) with ε > 0, i.e. when
the bifurcation is super (resp. sub-) critical.
Proof : See Appendix 6.4.
When compared with Proposition 4, Proposition 5 shows that considering
dynamically efficient equilibria implies restrictions for the existence of local
indeterminacy that are not necessary under dynamic inefficiency. Indeed,
expectations-driven fluctuations now occur without any condition on the
elasticity of the rental rate of capital εrk and are thus compatible with any
values of the sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution.
This conclusion is also confirmed when local indeterminacy is appraised
through the existence of a Hopf bifurcation. Let us indeed denote
θ˜ =
s+(1−α)(1−s)+(1−s)
√
(α−α)(1−α)
s+3(1−α)(1−s)
and
b˜ = min
{
− sR∗[θ[(1−s)α+s]−s] , (1−θ)R
∗−θ+θ√1−R∗
R∗[(1−θ)2R∗−θ(2−3θ)]
}
In order to simplify the formulation, we focus on the standard value s = 1/3
for the share of capital in total income. We then get:
9See Nourry and Venditti [11] for an illustration of such a policy in the Galor-type
OLG model.
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Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1-2, let s = 1/3. There exist α˜ ∈ (0, α)
and γF > γH > 1 such that if α ∈ (α˜, α), θ ∈ (s/[(1 − s)α + s], θ˜) and
b < b˜, the NSS is locally indeterminate when γ ∈ (γH , γF ), undergoes a flip
bifurcation when γ = γF and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation when γ = γH .
Moreover there generically exist locally indeterminate (resp. saddle-point
stable) period-two cycles when γ ∈ (γF , γF + ε) (resp. γ ∈ (γF − ε, γF ))
with ε > 0, i.e. when the bifurcation is super (resp. sub-) critical, and
locally indeterminate (resp. locally unstable) quasi-periodic cycles when γ ∈
(γH − , γH) (resp. γ ∈ (γH , γH + )) with  > 0, i.e. when the bifurcation
is super (resp. sub-) critical.
Proof : See Appendix 6.5.
Propositions 5 and 6 prove that the existence of expectations-driven fluctu-
ations are more likely to occur under dynamic inefficiency and thus confirm
the crucial role of the saving behavior. Moreover, in this case, any sta-
bilization policy targeting the steady state leaves room for welfare losses
associated with productive inefficiency.
5 Concluding comments
We have considered a two-sector OLG economy with two consumption goods
which enter the utility function in both periods of life through a composite
good. To simplify we have assumed that the share of each consumption
good into the composite one is constant. We have proved that although
dynamically efficient competitive equilibria are less likely to be locally inde-
terminate than dynamically inefficient ones, the existence of Pareto optimal
expectations-driven fluctuations becomes compatible with standard sectoral
technologies if the share of the pure consumption good is low enough.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (k∗, y∗) ∈ (0, k¯)×(0, k¯). Solving the second equation in (13) with respect
to θ and using the homogeneity of τ gives
θ (k∗, y∗) = T (k
∗,y∗)
T (k∗,y∗)−T2(k∗,y∗)(y∗−k∗) ∈ (0, 1)
Using (10) and solving the first equation in (13) with respect to B gives
B(k∗, y∗, γ) = −T1(k∗,y∗)T2(k∗,y∗)
( −k∗T2(k∗,y∗)
δγ [T3(k∗,y∗)+k∗T2(k∗,y∗)]
) 1
1−γ
Then (k∗, y∗) is a NSS if and only if θ = θ(k∗, y∗) and B = B(k∗, y∗, γ).
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
From (10), we derive
α′(v) = (1− γ)α(v)(1− α(v))/v (18)
Under Assumption 1, we get from the first order conditions of program (2):
T12 = −T11b < 0, T22 = T11b2 < 0, T31 = −T11a > 0 and T32 = T11ab,
with a ≡ k0/l0 > 0, b as defined by (16) and T11 < 0. Consider rk
as given by (16) together with T1k
∗/T3 = s/(1 − s), −T1/T2 = R∗ =
s/(1 − α)(1 − s) and the fact that the homogeneity of τ(k, y, `) implies
a = [(1− α)(1− s)(1− θb)− (1− θ)b] k∗/[(1 − α)(1 − s)]. Total differenci-
ation of (12) using (3), (10), (14) and (18) evaluated at the NSS gives the
characteristic polynomial Pγ(λ) = λ2 − λTθ(γ) +Dθ(γ) with
Dθ(γ) =
s
{
b
[
(1−s)α(γ−1)θ+θ(1−s)α−s(1−θ)
]
+(1−α)(1−s)
}
α(γ−1)(1−α)(1−s)2θb
Tθ(γ) =
1+α(γ−1)rk
{
[1−(1−θ)R∗b]2+θ2b2R∗
}
+θR∗brk
{
(1−θ) bα
s
+θbα+1−α
}
α(γ−1)[1−(1−θ)R∗b]θbrk
When θ = θ(k∗, y∗) and B = B(k∗, y∗, γ), the NSS and α remain constant
as γ is made to vary, and as in Grandmont et al. [9], we can study the
variations of Tθ(γ) and Dθ(γ) in the (T ,D) plane. Solving T and D with
respect to α(γ − 1) yields the following linear relationship ∆(T ):
D = ∆(T ) = SθT +M (19)
where M is a constant term and the slope Sθ of ∆(T ) is
Sθ = rksR
∗[1−(1−θ)R∗b][(1−s)α+s](θ−θ1)(b−b1)
(1−s){s+θR∗brkα[1−θ+θs](b−b2)} (20)
with
θ1 =
s
(1−s)α+s , b1 = − sR∗[(1−s)α+s](θ−θ1) and b2 = −
(1−α)s
α(1−θ+θs) (21)
For a given θ = θ(k∗, y∗), as γ spans the interval (1,+∞), Tθ(γ) and Dθ(γ)
vary linearly along the line ∆(T ).
As γ ∈ (1,+∞), the fundamental properties of ∆(T ) are characterized
from the consideration of its extremities. The starting point of the pair
(Tθ(γ),Dθ(γ)) is indeed obtained when γ = +∞:
lim
γ→+∞Dθ(γ) = D
∞ = s(1−α)(1−s)
lim
γ→+∞ Tθ(γ) = T
∞
θ =
[1−R∗b(1−θ)]2+θ2b2R∗
θb[1−R∗b(1−θ)]
(22)
while the end point is obtained when γ converges to 1 from above:
lim
γ→1+
Dθ(γ) = D1θ = ±∞ ⇔ b(θ − θ1)(b− b1) ≷ 0
lim
γ→1+
Tθ(γ) = T 1θ = ±∞ ⇔ bSθ ≶ 0
(23)
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D∞ ≷ 1 for any θ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if α ≷ α, with α > 0 if and only if
s < 1/2, while T ∞θ depends on the value of θ. Depending on θ, the pairs
(T ∞θ ,D∞) are located on an horizontal line above (below) the line D = 1
when α > (<)α. Therefore ∆(T ) is a half-line starting on the horizontal
line (T ∞θ ,D∞) and pointing upward or downward depending on D1θ = ±∞.
Let us now prove Proposition 3. We conclude from (23) that if b ∈
(0, bMax) then D1θ = +∞, T ∞θ > 0 and Sθ > 0. The characteristic roots are
always positive. Let us finally compute
P∞(1) = 1− T ∞θ +D∞ = − [1−R
∗b]{1−b[R∗(1−θ)+θ]}
bθ[1−R∗b(1−θ)]
Straightforward computations show that P∞(1) > 0 if and only if α > α,
θ > (1 − s)/[(1 − s)α + s] and b ∈ (1/R∗, bMax). Moreover, when s < 1/2
and α < α, if Dθ(γ) = 1 we get Tθ(γ) > 2. All this implies that for any
α ∈ (0, 1), any equilibrium path is unique and monotone when b ∈ (0, bMax).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let b < 0 so that P∞(1) > 0. Since T ∞θ < 0, we need to compute
P∞(−1) = 1 + T ∞θ +D∞ = [1−R
∗b(1−2θ)]{1−b[R∗(1−θ)−θ]}
bθ[1−R∗b(1−θ)]
Consider the bounds defined in (21) and let
θ2 =
s
1−α(1−s) , b3 =
1
R∗(1−2θ) and b4 =
1
R∗(1−θ)−θ (24)
When α > α, P∞(−1) > 0 if and only if i) θ ∈ (1/2, θ2) and b < b3, or, ii)
θ > θ2 and b ∈ (b4, b3). Moreover, we derive from (23) that D1θ = −∞ if and
only if a) θ < θ2, or, b) θ > θ2 and b ∈ (b1, 0). Finally, we get from (20)
that under the conditions a) or b), Sθ < 0 if and only if b > b2(> b1) and
rk > ˆrk = −s/ [θR∗αb(1− θ + θs)(b− b2)].
Using the expressions of Dθ(γ) and Tθ(γ) allows to show that when
Dθ(γ) = 1, Tθ(γ) > −2 if and only if
1 + rk
[
s[(1−s)α+s](θ−θ1)(b−b1)
b(1−s)2θ(α−α) P(b) + θR
∗bα[1−θ+θs]
s (b− b2)
]
< 0 (25)
with
P(b) = b2R∗ [(1− θ)2R∗ − θ(2− 3θ)]− 2b [(1− θ)R∗ − θ] + 1 > 0 (26)
for all θ ∈ (0, 1]. Under b < b3 and conditions a) or b), Tθ(γ) < −2 and
Sθ > 0 as long as b ≤ b2 or b ∈ (b2, 0) and rk ∈ (0, ˆrk).
Based on all this, we now prove Proposition 4. Let α > s/(1 − s)(> α)
so that θ2 > 1/2 > θ1.
1 - Assume that θ = θ1 + ε ≤ 1/2 with ε > 0 small and b > b2(> b1). It
follows that P∞(−1) < 0 and the term between brackets in (25) is negative.
Moreover Tθ(γ) ≥ −2 if and only if
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rk ≥ − 1s[(1−s)α+s](b−b1)
b(1−s)2θ(α−α) P(b)+
θR∗bα[1−θ+θs]
s
(b−b2)
≡ rk(> ˆrk) (27)
Moreover, there exists ¯rk > rk such that Tθ(γ) = 2 when rk = ¯rk and the
half-line is given by ∆¯. Therefore Tθ(γ) ∈ (−2, 2) as long as rk ∈ (rk, ¯rk).
Let us denote εˆ the value of ε such that the denominator of the ratio in
(27) is equal to zero. The maximal admissible value of ε is such that ε¯ =
min{εˆ, 1/2 − θ1}. It follows that when θ ∈ (θ1, θ¯) with θ¯ = θ1 + ε¯ and
rk ∈ (rk, ¯rk), we get a half-line above ∆1 as shown on Figure 1. This
proves the first part of Proposition 4.
2 - Note from (20) that limrk→ˆrk Sθ =∞. When rk = ˆrk, the half-line
is thus given by ∆ˆ and there exists ˜rk ∈ (ˆrk, rk) such that when θ ∈ (θ1, θ¯)
and rk = ˜rk, we get a half-line such that ∆˜. As a result, if rk ∈ (˜rk, rk)
the half-line is given by ∆2 as shown on Figure 1. This proves the second
part of Proposition 4.
The bifurcation values γH , γF and γT are respectively defined as the
solutions of
Dθ(γ) = 1, Pγ(−1) = 1 + Tθ(γ) +Dθ(γ) = 0, Pγ(1) = 1− Tθ(γ) +Dθ(γ) = 0
with the corresponding values of θ and rk.
D∞
(T∞θ , D
∞)
γF
γH
γT
γT ∆1
∆2∆ˆ
∆¯
∆
∆˜
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Figure 1: Hopf and flip bifurcations with α > s/(1− s)(> α).
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the bounds defined in (21) and (24). α < α implies D∞ < 1. We
get θ2 < 1/2 < θ1 and P∞(−1) > 0 if and only if i) θ ∈ (θ2, 1/2) and b < b4,
or, ii) θ > 1/2 and b ∈ (b3, b4). Moreover, D1θ = +∞ if and only if θ > θ1
and b < b1 with b1 < b3 < b4. This implies that when P∞(−1) > 0 then
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D1θ = −∞ and any Hopf bifurcation is ruled out. Also, when Dθ(γ) = −1,
Tθ(γ) < 0 if b < b2 with b2 > b3 if
θ < θ3 =
s2+α(1−s)
2s2+α(1−s)2 ∈ (1/2, 1)
Based on all this, we now prove Proposition 5. We focus here on the case
in which P∞(1) > 0 and P∞(−1) > 0. As b < 0 we already know that
P∞(1) > 0.
i) Assume first that θ ∈ (θ2, 1/2) and b < b4. This implies P∞(−1) > 0
and thus D1θ = −∞. A flip bifurcation occurs if Tθ(γ) < 0 when Dθ(γ) = −1.
This is obtained provided b < b2. Part i) is then proved by assuming b < b¯
with b¯ = min{b2, b4}. We get indeed the half-line ∆ as shown on Figure 2.
ii) Assume now that θ ∈ (1/2, θ3) and b ∈ (b3, b¯). We get as previously
P∞(−1) > 0, D1θ = −∞ and Tθ(γ) < 0 when Dθ(γ) = −1, which proves
part ii).
In both cases the flip bifurcation value γF is defined as the solution of
Pγ(−1) = 1 + Tθ(γ) +Dθ(γ) = 0.
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Figure 2: Flip bifurcation with α < α.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the bounds defined in (21) and (24). Let θ > θ1 and b < b1(< b3 <
b4) so that D1θ = +∞ and P∞(−1) < 0. Moreover Sθ < 0 as b1 < b2. Local
indeterminacy may arise as shown by ∆ on Figure 3 only if T ∞θ ∈ (−2, 0),
i.e. only if P(b) < 0 with P(b) as given by (26).
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Figure 3: Flip and Hopf bifurcations with α ∈ (α˜, α).
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Let us then consider
θ± =
s+(1−α)(1−s)±(1−s)
√
(α−α)(1−α)
s+3(1−α)(1−s) and b+ =
(1−θ)R∗−θ+θ√1−R∗
R∗[(1−θ)2R∗−θ(2−3θ)]
It is easy to show that (1− θ)2R∗− θ(2− 3θ) < 0 if and only if θ ∈ (θ−, θ+)
with θ1 > θ−. Moreover, θ1 < θ+ if and only if g(α) = [(1 − s)α) +
s]
√
(α− α)(1− α) − α2(1 − s) + α(1 + 2s) − 2s > 0, with g(0) < 0 and
g(α) ≤ 0 under Assumption 3. When s = 1/3, we get limα→α g′(α) < 0. It
follows that there exists α1 ∈ (0, α) such that when α ∈ (α1, α), g(α) > 0.
As a result we conclude that when α ∈ (α1, α), θ ∈ (θ1, θ+) and b < b+,
we get P(b) < 0. Therefore assuming θ ∈ (θ1, θ+) and b < min{b1, b+},
we derive from (25) that there exists α˜ ∈ [α1, α) such that if α ∈ (α˜, α),
Tθ(γ) > −2 when Dθ(γ) = 1. Proposition 6 is then proved under the
following conditions: α ∈ (α˜, α), θ ∈ (s/[(1 − s)α + s], θ˜) and b < b˜ with
θ˜ = θ+ and b˜ = min{b1, b+}. We get indeed the half-line ∆ as shown
on Figure 3. The bifurcation values γH and γF are finally defined as the
solutions of
Dθ(γ) = 1 and Pγ(−1) = 1 + Tθ(γ) +Dθ(γ) = 0
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